Abstract-It has been noted in the literature that firms rarely follow a single theoretical model when designing their compensation policy. This study illustrates how a fuzzy cluster analysis can be helpful in understanding the way employees are rewarded according to firms' specificity and market conditions. For this purpose, we convert linked employer-employee data (LEED) into firm level data prior to fuzzy clustering. Then, we explore the particular distribution of firms on the emerged fuzzy partition to sort them by compensation policy and, eventually, to examine the potential factors behind a specific option.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper revisits and expands on the methodological aspects of a comprehensive study on compensation policies carried out in [21] . Compensation policy entails different dimensions of pay, notably pay level, pay grades, pay growth, pay flexibility, and pay penalty. Firms configure these dimensions according to their own specificity. We can therefore expect them to vary across firms, thus giving rise to a heterogeneous population. In this study, we explore the fuzzy sets theory to model the diversity of compensation policies, and further investigate the characteristics of firms that might affect those policies. Readers interested in furthering their understanding of aspects of economic theory on this subject may refer to [21] .
The problem we are addressing can be framed as follows. The theoretical models for compensation policy are useful tools to segment firms according to the way they reward employees. Two broad and almost antagonistic models are identified as Internal Labor Market (ILM) and External Labor Market (ELM).
The ILM model follows the rationale of fostering a longterm relationship between employees and organizations while simultaneously protecting investments in firm-specific skills [9] . The wages are attached to jobs rather than to workers, grow with tenure, and more importantly, are not adjusted to the business cycles or other external factors. There is also a limited discretion on wages. The ELM model has the opposite characteristics and is highly responsive to market conditions. However, employers generally use a variety of incentive devices to obtain more advantages from employees. This includes, among others, high pay to avoid shirking [16] , reduction employee turnovers [15] , rewarding high-performers through group or individual incentives [11] or differentiating the key group of employees [14] . Hence, we can expect firms to tailor the compensation policy so as to suit their specificities and, of course, to face the market conditions. Despite the expected diversity among firms, we nonetheless believe that some, say c ≥ 2 models or, more appropriately, typologies of compensation policy prevail, and the way firms position themselves in the labor market is a matter of degree in each typology. This hybrid characteristic of compensation policies is stressed by Baker in [1] . Therefore, we use a fuzzy clustering approach to empirically examine firms' compensation policy in the Portuguese labor market. In a post-hoc analysis, we attempt to identify the factors explaining the emerged typologies.
II. DESCRIPTION OF DATA
The Portuguese LEED, called Quadros de Pessoal (QP), are our source data. The QP is a longitudinal data set compiled annually by the Ministry of Economy and Employment, and is mandatory for every firm with wage earners (see e.g. [4] ). We limit our focus to large-sized firms, i.e. ≥ 250 workers. This option aims to prevent additional heterogeneity due to firms' size. The sample we are working with comprises N = 669 firms, and is related to the year of 2009. The longitudinal information, whenever necessary, is based on the period 2004 − 2009.
Since the firms are at the heart of our analysis, we first convert the employee-wise data into firm level data, following a strategy similar to that of [12] . The resulting constructs are intended to reflect the mechanisms behind the design of a compensation policy, as detailed in [21] . We can divide the underlying variables into two major groups: internal and external [17] . The internal variables are, on substantive grounds, potentially important to profile the emerged compensation typologies. In turn, the external variables are used to a posteriori identify the factors behind each typology, and can be useful tools for predictive purposes. Below, we present each group separately and, where necessary, summarize the purpose of each variable.
A. Internal variables
There are n I = 15 internal variables, which can be arranged in four distinct dimensions of pay, as follows. Pay Levels (8): -Hourly wage: position of the firm in the labor market; -Firm / industry wage: position of the firm in the corresponding industry; -Gini: inequality of wage distribution; -Skewness: wages asymmetry; -Entry wage: competition around skills; -Education premium: value of general skills; -Wage hierarchy: job hierarchy; -Intra job dispersion: internal equity and incentive devices. Pay Growth (3): -Wage growth: (self-explanatory); -Growth skewness: selective incentive devices; -Tenure profile: firm-specific skills. Pay Flexibility (3): -Wage cushion: incentive device measuring the difference between the total wage and the wage that has been bargained; -Wage adjustment: wage used as adjustment to the business cycle; -Rent sharing: incentive device. Pay Penalty (1): -Gender wage gap: penalization of female workers.
B. External variables
The following n E = 13 external variables are used to characterize fuzzy clusters in a post hoc analysis. The categories of the affiliation variable are in accordance with EUROSTAT [10] .
In sum: we use internal variables to cluster firms by compensation policy and, subsequently, examine the potential factors behind a specific option, using external variables.
III. DATA ANALYSIS

A. Fuzzy clustering
We opt for a fuzzy clustering based on a matrix factorization approach, since we are interested in profiling wage policies that are somewhat extreme. This is expected to allow us to position firms in a structure set out by extreme profiles [13] . The prior assumption behind this approach is that the data matrix can be decomposed into a product of two matrices.
Formally, suppose
is the data matrix, where n ≥ 2 is the dimension of the feature space, and N is the sample size. In our case, n = n I = 15 is the number of internal variables, and N = 669. We assume there are two matrices, U and V, such that
although, in practice, we find an approximate decomposition of X. In this relation, (1), together with the restrictions on µ ik , maps X into a fuzzy c-partition. The columns of V are referred to as prototypes and µ ik is the membership degree of kth data point, x k , in fuzzy cluster i. Furthermore, the product (1) has a geometrical interpretation; it configures a polytope, say P c , with c extreme points, spanned by c columns of the matrix V, v 1 , v 2 , ..., v c . Therefore, the data points are, by assumption, drawn from P c as convex combinations of the fuzzy c-partition prototypes. As usual, each data point x k is represented in a fuzzy c-partition by the vector of membership degrees, µ k = (µ 1k , µ 2k , ..., µ ck ) ∈ S c , where S c is the unit simplex
and here, in particular,
A common procedure to estimate the matrices U and V, given c, is to minimize the objective function
subject to the constraints on membership degrees µ ik referred to above. Here, ∥A∥ F is the Frobenius norm of the matrix A. We note, however, that, given V, the minimization of J c in (2) reduces to N independent least squares problems. Therefore, a common solver can be used to estimate U. This means the factorization of the data matrix X is ultimately dependent on the way we estimate the matrix of prototypes V.
In this study, we use the archetypal analysis [7] approach to estimate V. Accordingly, the prototypes, now archetypes, are themselves convex combinations of the data points,
where 0 ≤ β ki ≤ 1 and ∑ k β ki = 1. As a result, the estimation of the matrix V reduces here to the estimation of the coefficients β ki . In practice, we use an alternate optimization between U and V; the β ki coefficients are estimated using the updating rule given by Ding, Li, and Jordan in [8] ; the matrix U is estimated by means of MATLAB function lsqlin(), with 'interior-point algorithm' option [6] .
We note that, in [21] , V is estimated using the factorized fuzzy c-means algorithm [20] , which is akin to that of [3] . It is a special case of the archetypal analysis, where the β weights are calculated from the membership degrees µ ik , and not estimated explicitly.
B. Compensation typologies
Following [21] , we use the Xie and Beni index [22] to assess the goodness-of-fit of the estimated fuzzy c-partitions. The best fit is achieved for c = 3 clusters, meaning that the compensation policies of the Portuguese labor market of large-sized firms can be modeled by a fuzzy 3-partition. This result, as well as the profile of the emerged fuzzy clusters displayed in Table I , is consistent with the earlier work. In this table, the archetypes are identified as A 1 , A 2 and A 3 ; in the second column, we represent the sample average values, for comparison purposes. We can label the compensation policies underlying the estimated archetypes as follows: A 1 -Competitive, A 2 -quasi-Internal Labor Market (q-ILM), and A 3 -Incentive. At first glance, A 1 and A 3 typologies represent two extreme types of compensation policy, while the q-ILM appears as an intermediate case. For example, A 1 has the lowest levels of wage (3.51); the incentive devices target a small proportion of employees who earn higher wages, while a large proportion of employees earn low wages (Skewness = 8.32); and wages are particularly procyclical as they fall in response to an increase in unemployment (Wage adjustment = −0.54). Firms clustered in A 3 pay the highest wage (9.63), and above the industry level (Firm/industry wage = 0.38). These firms use several incentive devices, notably wage cushion (2.88), differentiation of employees in same jobs (Intra-job dispersion = 0.33), reward high-performers through specific wage growth (Growth skewness = 2.64) and rent sharing schemes (0.12). The distinctive features of q-ILM (A 2 ) are the tenure wage profile, which suggests that individual wages grow with the length of contract (Tenure profile = 0.20) and the returns to education (Education premium = 0.40).
We note, however, that some characteristics occur across all typologies. Without going into detail, we stress the striking similarity of fuzzy clusters in the use of wages as an adjustment process. This evidence is in line with [5] , since wages are highly responsive to macroeconomic conditions in Portugal. In Fig. 1 we depict, in the unit simplex S 3 , the estimated membership degree vectors of every firm to gain a more accurate picture of their distribution on the polytope P 3 . If we further accept 0.90 as the threshold for the full membership in each fuzzy cluster, we realize (Table II) that only 35% of firms share the characteristics of a single typology. This means, most firms' compensation policy mixes characteristics of different typologies, as claimed in the literature [1] . However, a closer look at Table II evidences the concentration on the edges or, equivalently, in two fuzzy clusters, since 21% of firms have membership in A 1 − A 2 , 23.6% in A 2 − A 3 , and 6.7% in A 1 − A 3 . In particular, more than 80% of firms are positioned on the path of edges A 1 − A 2 − A 3 , including typologies. 
C. Post-hoc analysis
A common procedure to study the potential factors behind a compensation policy would be to defuzzify the membership degrees, and subsequently analyze the pattern of external variables in each crisp typology. However, the distribution of firms on the path A 1 − A 2 − A 3 allows us to reasonably use the theorem below, which is established in [19] . It allows a mapping between multivariate data and a real interval, via fuzzy c-partition. The notation A i → A j indicates that we steadily move along the edge A i − A j , from the vertex A i to the vertex A j , j > i.
Theorem 1: Consider a fuzzy c-partition of the data matrix X, and let S c be the corresponding unit simplex. Let the vertices of S c be enumerated as A 1 , A 2 , ..., A c . Assume that each data point has membership in one or, at most, two consecutive fuzzy clusters, that is, positioned on the edge A i − A i+1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ c − 1, of S c . Then, the utility function
is a strictly increasing sequence of real numbers.
In our example, if two firms k and k ′ are positioned on the edge A 1 − A 2 , and ρ (k) < ρ (k ′ ), then the firm k ′ is closer to q-ILM typology than the firm k; reciprocally, this firm is closer to the Competitive typology than the former. The utility function ρ is, therefore, a scalar indicator of firms' compensation policy, at least of those positioned on the path A 1 − A 2 − A 3 . We explore this in an attempt to identify the potential factors that might be conditioning firms' individual option.
Even though the results of fuzzy clustering of firm data do not fully meet the conditions of the above theorem, we believe that it can be used as a good approximation. The major difficulty lies in the selection of the sequence η (i), which can be subjective. Here, we consider a 0 − 1 normalization of hourly wage in each typology (Table I , fist row), which leads to η (1) = 0, η (2) = 0.06, and η (3) = 1. We subsequently use the resulting utility function ρ ∈ [0, 1] in a regression analysis, with the expectation of predicting the compensation policy by means of external variables. In sum, the variation of the utility function from 0 to 1 approximately translates the gradual movement of compensation policies from the Competitive typology to Incentive typology, passing through q-ILM (see Fig. 1 ); we therefore explore it for prediction purposes.
Due to the limited range of the utility function ρ, we opt for a Tobit regression model. This model can formally be written as a relationship between the observed outcome, here ρ (k), and the latent variable of interest, ρ * (k), as follows [18] :
for each firm k = 1, 2, ..., 669. The n E external variables, say z = (z 1 , z 2 , ..., z n E ), are linearly related to ρ * , i.e.
where α 0 is the constant term, α 1 , α 2 , ..., are the Tobit regression coefficients, and ε k is an independent normal random variable, with zero mean and constant variance σ 2 . In this context, the α coefficient associated with a numerical variable has the same meaning as in ordinary least squares regression, whereas the coefficient of a categorical variable measures the impact of a given category when compared to the category that has been chosen as the reference. Some missing values in external variables are replaced by the corresponding mean value. The results of Tobit regression are displayed in Table  III In general terms, when a numerical variable with positive α increases, the compensation policy moves in the direction Competitive → q-ILM → Incentive; the reverse holds true when α is negative. In the case of categorical variables, the coefficient of a given category weights its relative importance in moving in one or other direction. Looking at Table III , we realize that the workers with fixed-term contract prevail in firms closer to the Competitive typology, while part-time workers push firms to the Incentive typology. This only partially confirms the labor market segmentation theory, since we would expect both groups of workers to be present in firms sharing the characteristics of the former typology.
Female, blue-collar, and young workers tend to be associated with firms paying lower and flexible wages, that is, those closer to the Competitive typology. It is expected that highskill workers (white collar workers) are employed in firms paying higher wages. Whereas no significant differentiation in wage typologies is found in manufacturing, the same does not hold in services, where significant industry differences are found, in accordance with knowledge intensity. Less knowledge intensive services (KIS) pushes them to Competitive typology, contrasting with more KIS (High technology KIS, market KIS, and KI Financial Services), which tends to push them in the opposite direction. As expected, the q-ILM and Incentive typologies are common in banking industry, while strategies to reduce labor costs are found in labor intensive services with low knowledge intensity.
Firms using decentralized bargaining systems (multiple or single firm arrangements) are closer to the Incentive typology, possibly because they allow more scope for rewarding skills. Larger firms are more prone to share characteristics of the Competitive typology; this finding contradicts some studies, since larger firms are likely to pay higher wages [2] . Most probably, this is due to the specificities of the Portuguese labor market, where a significant number of large firms follow generic low value added strategies, and use low-skilled workers. Finally, firms with higher sales per worker tend towards the Incentive typology, which signals an association between higher wages and labor productivity.
IV. CONCLUSION
We use a fuzzy cluster analysis to quantify the mixing characteristics of firms' compensation policy that has long been reported in the literature. We find three broad typologies in the Portuguese labor market, and realize that none fits most firms (65%) exactly. However, the heterogeneity within firms is seemingly not so extreme, since more than 80% of estimated compensation policies result from sharing, at most, two consecutive typologies. As a consequence, we extend the use of the fuzzy representation of firms, by taking advantage of a result that, under certain conditions, provides a scalar measure for multivariate data as mapped into a fuzzy cpartition. We are able to reasonably predict the expected compensation policy of a given firm by means of what we refer to as external variables. This can be a useful decision tool for policy makers. We note that some of our conclusions are in line with those reported in studies using different types of data analysis, which gives us confidence in the results achieved and in continuing this investigation under the framework of the fuzzy sets theory.
